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Abstract 
 
Economic theories suggest that financial variables are instantaneously affected by each other. 
To empirically analyse their contemporary relationships, we specify a structural vector 
autoregressive model that pairs China’s equity market with Asian and European equity 
markets. The foreign exchange and money markets are also included for analysis since they 
are risk sources to stock markets. The empirical result indicates an increasing integration of 
China’s stock market with the Asian stock markets through time, but it is not symmetrical; 
China’s stock market has become more influenced by the Asian stock markets, while its 
influence on the Asian stock markets has not equally increased. The result also suggests that 
the shock of foreign exchange markets is a common risk source to the Asian stock markets. 
While China’s and the European stock markets have no contemporary relationship once the 
common factor of US stock market was considered, the result suggests that the exchange rate 
and interest rate risks are cross-assets to equity and cross-regional between China and Europe 
in the global financial crisis period.    
 
 
 
Key words: impulse response; variance decomposition; return spillover; volatility spillover; 
within-asset behaviour; cross-assets behaviour; transmission 
JEL Classification Codes: 
1. Corresponding author: Dr Y.-H. Chen, Email: yen.chen@canterbury.ac.uk. Telephone: 
+44(0)1227-782571. Address: Canterbury Christ Church University Business School, 
North Holmes Road, Canterbury, Kent-CT1 1QU, United Kingdom. 
2. Dr D. Santamaria. Email: daniel.santamaria@canterbury.ac.uk. Address: Canterbury 
Christ Church University Business School, North Holmes Road, Canterbury, Kent-CT1 
1QU, United Kingdom. 
3. Dr Y. Liu. Email: yang.liu@canterbury.ac.uk.  Address: Canterbury Christ Church 
University, Augustine House, Canterbury, Kent CT1 1QU, United Kingdom. 
  
  
2 
 
1. Introduction 
The seminal work of King and Wadhwani (1990) has led to a discussion in international 
finance literature about how shocks are transmitted across borders. A range of different 
methodologies has been proposed to assess the linkages of financial markets. Several 
terminologies, such as ‘contagion’, ‘spillover’, and ‘interdependence’, have also been coined 
and defined to study the comovement of financial asset prices in the international scale (e.g., 
Engle, Ito and Lin, 1994; Eichengreen et al., 1995; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Karolyi, 2003; 
Dungey and Martin, 2004; Boyer et al., 2006; Bekaert et al. 2009) .  
With the rise of emerging economies, many subsequent studies have devoted to investigate 
how economic or financial shocks transmit from developed markets to emerging markets, for 
example, Wei et al. (1995), Liu and Pan (1997), Masih and Masih (1999), , Ng (2000), 
Miyakoshi (2003), Lee, Rui and Wang (2004), Worthington and Higgs (2004), Tai (2007), 
Kenourgios, Samitas, and Paltalidis (2011), Samarakoon (2011), Kotkatvuori-Örnberg, 
Nikkinen and Äijö (2013), Beirne et al. (2013), Bekaert et al. (2014), and Morales and 
Andreosso-O'Callaghan (2014). To further understand the issue, in this paper we analyse the 
linkage of China’s stock market with other stock markets across the globe. In addition, we 
also look at the linkages of stock markets with other financial markets, i.e. foreign exchange 
markets and money markets. For doing this, we employ a two-stage analysis that was built up 
on the framework of factor models. In analysing the interdependence of asset returns, the 
factor models based on arbitrage pricing theory are usually applied, which state that the price 
of financial assets are determined by both common factors and idiosyncratic factors (Slonik, 
1974; Mahieu and Schotman, 1994; Masson, 1999; Bekaert et al. 2005; Corsetti et al. 2005; 
Dungey and Gajurel, 2014; Kaminsky, et al. 2016). Given the dominant impact of US stock 
market on world’s stock markets, on the first stage we apply a world-factor model to stock 
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markets, with the world factor proxied by the S&P 500 index, in order to obtain the extra 
world-factor stock market risk that is not resulted from the common stock risk factor.  
On the second stage, we pair China’s stock market with another stock market while allowing 
for the relevant foreign exchange rate in currency market and interest rate differential in 
money markets to be included in the analysis. We focus on China because the Chinese 
economy has been one of the fastest growing economy since its shifting to market-based 
economy in 1978, with its stock exchange becoming one of the largest markets in the world 
in terms of market capitalisation since its re-establishment in 1990. There are also some 
literatures that focused on China’s stock market, including, for example, Bailey (1994), Hu et 
al. (1997), Huang et al. (2000), Hatemi-J and Roca (2004), Wang and Firth (2004), Li (2007), 
and Wang and Di Iorio (2007), in which the general finding is that the US market plays an 
important role in the East Asian stock markets. Nonetheless, whether China’s stock market 
was interdependent with international stock markets is inconclusive. More recent studies 
researched on the interactions between China’s stock market and other stock markets still 
generate different results. Huyghebaert and Wang (2010), for example, find that China’s 
stock market is neither influenced by the USA’s nor affected by Hong Kong’s and 
Singapore’s stock markets after the Asian financial crisis. Wang and Wang (2010) instead 
find that, between 1994 and 2002, the Chinese market was connected with the US and Japan 
through volatility spillovers, which were bi-directional rather than uni-directional from the 
developed to developing markets. Zhou, Zhang and Zhang (2012) find that the US stock 
market has dominant volatility impacts on the world equity markets, while China’s stock 
market also has had impacts on other markets since 2005. They also find that China’s market 
is more connected to those markets with the same cultural background, i.e., Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, than with Western and other Asian markets. Although the studies on the linkages 
between China’s and other major international stock markets have increased generally due to 
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the increasing integration of the Chinese economy with the rest of the world, the literature is 
still relatively few. 
Apart from the within-asset behaviour between stock markets, the extant literature also 
suggests some factors common to stock markets. For example, as argued by the Calvo 
(1996), herd mentality of global investors would lead to the simultaneous withdrawals from a 
group of related markets, resulting in the comovement of stock prices in emerging markets. 
Masson (1998) also argues that investor psychology and market sentiments can lead to the 
simultaneous movement of stock markets. By contrast, Eichengreen et al. (1996) suggest that 
spillover effects tend to appear in countries with close trade linkages, and Glick and Rose 
(1999) suggest that currency crises affect geographically- proximal countries tied together by 
international trade. Since the Asian economies export their goods to the common 
destinations, namely the US, Japan and China, the third-market competition would lead to the 
competitive devaluation of their currencies. Further, Hu et al. (1997) find that the volatility of 
foreign exchange market can explain the moments of stock return series, while Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) find that trade and financial linkages are highly correlated. 
More recently, Walti (2011) suggests that apart from trade and financial integrations, 
common monetary policy and the elimination of exchange rate volatility can also lead to 
stronger stock market synchronisation. Furthermore, Jansen and Tsai (2010) find that stocks 
in bear state respond more than stocks in bull state to a surprising monetary policy, while 
Baig and Goldfajn (1998) and Christopher et al. (2012) find that sovereign spreads and 
sovereign credit ratings influence regional stock and bond markets. The study of Panchenko 
and Wu (2009) finds the interdependence of stock market and credit market in emerging 
economies, whereas other studies, for example, Elyasiani and Mansur (1998), Johnson and 
Soenen (2002), and Lustig et al. (2011), find that interest rate differential between countries 
is an important common risk factor in currency markets and stock markets. By following the 
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literature, we therefore also include two ‘international’ factors, namely foreign exchange rate 
and interest rate differential, in our analysis.1 2 
Given the large market value and the fast development pace of China’s stock market, much 
more researches are needed to understanding its linkages with other financial markets. 
However, the previous studies mainly focus on the interaction of China’s stock market with 
other stock markets. Our first contribution to the literature is that we extend the study on 
China’s stock market to include currency asset and money asset as well as equity asset.3 Our 
study therefore is an effort to understand the within-asset behaviour of stock markets and 
cross-asset behaviour among stock market, currency market and money market.  
Our second contribution is that we employ a Structural Vector Autoregressive model 
(SVAR). The SVAR models were originally applied in macroeconomical studies. While they 
have also been applied to financial economics, the studies are relatively few. Some examples 
include Hess and Lee (1999), Gallagher and Taylor (2002), Binswanger (2004) and Fraser 
and Groenewold (2006), which all focus on the relationship between stock prices and real 
economic variables. There are also some SVAR studies on the cross-assets behaviour and the 
within-asset behaviour of financial markets. For example, Ehrmann et al. (2011) apply a 
SVAR analysis to study the interactions of the stocks, bonds, money markets and exchange 
rates between the USA and the Euro area in the period of 1989 to 2008. In general, they find 
that the international cross-assets behaviours are significant, although the within-asset 
                                                          
1 China adopted a managed floating exchange rate regime with reference to a basket of currencies in July 
2005, but which currency is included in the Chinese yuan’s basket and the weight of each component currency 
have never been revealed.    
2 The People’s Bank of China abolished the upper limits on inter-bank lending rate in June 1996, which since 
then has been left to determine by the forces of transactions. In January 2007, the Shanghai Interbank Offered 
Rate was formally launched.  
3 The Chinese yuan has been heavily pegged to the US dollar, especially in the Global Financial Crisis period. 
However, there have also been some reforms; the original daily trading band of the Chinese yuan against the 
US dollar was ±0.3%, which was widened to ±0.5% in May 2007 and ±1.0% in April 2012.  
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behaviours unsurprisingly provide the strongest international transmission of financial 
shocks. Dungey et al. (2010) apply their SGARCH model, which is a SVAR augmented with 
the multivariate GARCH(1,1) process for resolving the identification problem, to study the 
four stock markets of Hong Kong, Korean, Indonesia, and Thailand. They find that in the 
Asian crisis period Hong Kong and Korea became more contagious to others and Indonesia 
became more sensitive to others, while Thailand became more detached to others. However, 
their study only focuses on the within-asset behaviours of international equity markets. In 
Dungey et al. (2015), they extend the SGARCH model to embed smooth transition functions 
so as to dating the phases of crisis and non-crisis periods. Their model allows them to identify 
the different phases during the Global Financial Crisis as well as the interactions between 
financial markets. However, their study only focuses on the cross-assets behaviours between 
equity, REIT and Treasury bond in the USA. By contrast, our study focuses on the 
interactions of China’s stock market with other international stock markets, which, according 
to our survey, has never been analysed by the SVAR models. In other words, we analyse not 
only the cross-assets behaviours of China’s stock market with other financial markets but also 
its within-asset behaviours with other stock markets. Because the SVAR models are designed 
to resolve the simultaneity issue between endogenous variables, the methodology allows us to 
look beyond the modelling of data and look into the interactions of financial variables 
implied by economic theories.     
Furthermore, we also contribute to the testing of return spillover and volatility spillover. To 
utilise the SVAR model, some assumptions must be made for the instantaneous relationships 
between financial assets. The classical economics explains that government’s economic 
behaviours will influence both the values of currency asset and money asset. In an efficient 
stock market, the investors would respond to local news and global news fairly quickly and 
hence, the structural shocks in foreign exchange market, money market as well as the stock 
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market should all be the sources of risk to the stock market. With this economic reasoning, 
we specify a cause-effect relationship in our SVAR model that incorporates this view. In 
addition, the specification is over-identified that allows us to further test the significance of 
factor loadings in stock market. On one hand, we therefore can test the causality between 
stock markets, i.e., whether the stock returns relationship is unrelated, uni-directional or bi-
directional. In other words, the structural form in our model can identify the contemporary  
‘return spillover’ between financial markets. On the other hand, if one is willing to view the 
structural shocks of financial markets as risk sources to one another, then the immediate 
impulse response function of our SVAR model can be thought of as the measurement of 
‘volatility spillover’ from one market to the other, while the instantaneous relationship 
between these financial variables can be thought of as the risk transmission channel. In 
addition to the test of the significance of risk sources, the forecast error variance 
decomposition function of the  SVAR model can measure the relative magnitudes of these 
risk sources. Our analysis therefore not only examines the existence of ‘volatility spillover’, 
but it also provides information on the relative importance of financial variables in affecting 
each other.    
Finally, for testing the general applicability of our model, the empirical analysis looks at the 
data range from the beginning of 2005 to the end of 2014, during which period the global 
financial environment has changed dramatically due to the Global Financial Crisis and the 
Eurozone Debt Crisis. Specifically, we apply the model to three subperiods; the pre-crisis 
period, the Global Financial Crisis period and the Eurozone Debt Crisis period. We also 
apply the empirical framework to a range of developed and developing markets across the 
globe. Our analysis is temporal through several global events and spatial in international 
scale, which makes contribution to better understanding the cross-assets and within-asset 
behaviours of financial variables.  
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The rest of the study is structured as follows. In section 2 we present the structural form of 
contemporary return relationship, and how it is to be tested based on a SVAR model. Section 
3 discusses the data source and their preliminary statistics. Section 4 presents and discusses 
the empirical results, and in particular, we also discuss how the over-identified SVAR is used 
to determine the risk transmission channel based on a sequence of likelihood ratio tests. 
Section 5 then offers the concluding remarks.    
2. Empirical Methodology  
2.1 The simultaneous structural form 
We begin the analysis by assuming that all stock markets share a common world factor that 
determines the average level of stock market returns across international markets. The proxy 
for the world factor in our model is the S&P500 index of the USA and therefore, the world-
factor model can be written as:  
 2,0~, yiiiii yywR          (1) 
where iR  are the stock market returns of the sample country i and i  = CHN, JPN, KOR, 
TWN, HKG, SGP, AUS, RUS, DEU, FRA or GBR, and  the variable w  represents the 
common world factor that impacts upon all stock markets with the loading i  for the country 
i . The return of stock market not related to the common world shock is therefore split into 
two parts, i  represents the expected excess return of stock market i  above the return of the 
world market w , and 
iy  represents the extra world-factor risk. One advantage of using the 
single world-factor model is that the extra world-factor covariance is not zero because the 
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model makes no assumption about the within-asset and cross-assets covariance, i.e., 
  jiyy ji  ,0,cov .  
To analyse the contemporary effects of the cross-assets behaviour amongst stock market, 
foreign exchange market and money market as well as the within-asset behaviour between 
stock markets, we assume that the financial variables in interest have the following 
instantaneous relationship,  
112121   yy         (2) 
2224231212   idfxyy       (3) 
fxidfx  334          (4) 
idid  4           (5) 
where 1y  is the stock market returns of China and 2y  is the stock market return of one of the 
rest 10 countries acquired from the world factor model (1), fx  is the depreciation rate of the 
Chinese currency with respect to country 2’s currency, and id  is the interest rate differential 
of China with respect to the corresponding country. The coefficient   allows the model to 
catch the instantaneous response of a variable to another variable. For example, the 
significance of 12  would indicate that China’s stock market is contemporarily affected by 
the price change of country 2’s stock market, while the significance of 23  would indicate 
that country 2’s stock market is contemporarily affected by the change of China-country 2 
foreign exchange rate. The terms   in the equations are idiosyncratic factors that are unique 
to the specific asset markets. The contributions of idiosyncratic shocks to the volatility of 
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asset prices are determined by the loadings 0 . These factors are assumed to be stochastic 
processes with zero mean and unit variance, i.e.,  1,0~ . 
To explain, notice from equation (5) that the variable id  is assumed to be completely 
autonomous in the structure, while the variable fx  is causally prior to the stock markets. The 
variable fx  is set to be responsive to the change of the variable id  in equation (4) because in 
macroeconomics the Mundell-Fleming model dictates that both variables would respond to 
government’s economic policies, and in interest rate parity condition the change of interest 
rate differential would change the expectation of exchange rate. In equation (2) and (3), the 
setting of 
2y  being responsive to the change of the variables id  and fx  suggests that country 
2’s stock market is more developed and opened and hence, investors respond more quickly to 
news in foreign exchange and money markets.  
The above instantaneous relationship between the financial assets can be written in a 
structural form,  
BAy            (6) 
if we define,  
  idfxyyy 21         (7) 
  idfx  21         (8) 
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To complete the specification of the structural model, the idiosyncratic shocks should have 
the cross-sectional and temporal properties,   
  jiE tjtit  ,0,,         (11) 
  ttjiE tjtit  ,,0,,         (12) 
2.2 Structural Vector Autoregression 
To satisfy the properties of idiosyncratic shocks (11) and (12), we write the equation (6) into 
a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model that catches the dynamics of the own 
autocorrelations and cross autocorrelations within the vector ty ,  
tptptt ByAyAAy   


 11       (13) 
where the coefficient matrices, 

iA  for pi ,,1 , are structural coefficients, and the 
structural errors t  are white noise.  
To transform the SVAR into a reduced form VAR for estimation, one can pre-multiply the 
above equation (13) by the inverse of A to get, 
  tptptt BAyAAyAAvAy 
11
11
11 



        (14) 
  
12 
 
With the operation, we thus have a stable four-dimensional VAR(p) process for empirical 
estimation. To see that equation (14) is a reduced form VAR that allows for estimation, we 
can define vAc 1 , 
 jj AAA
1
  pj ,1 , and tt BAu 
1 , so that,  
tptptt uyAyAcy   11        (15) 
where ty  is a (4×1) vector of the observed variables defined in equation (7), the Aj’s  (j=1,…, 
p) are the (4×4) reduced form coefficient matrices and c is a (4×1) vector of intercept terms 
allowing for the possibility of nonzero mean )( tyE . Finally, tu  is 4-dimensional innovation 
process with 0)( tuE  , uttuuE )(  and tsuuE st  ,0)( .  
The restrictions imposed on the matrices A and B in the SVAR equation (13) can be used to 
identify shocks and trace these out by employing impulse response functions and forecast 
error variance decomposition. For such purposes, it should be noted that the instantaneous 
relationship specified in equations (6) to (10) can be shifted to the interpretation of the 
unexpected part of their shocks t , since in our case we have tt BAu  . More specifically, 
the reduced form residuals required for the estimation of impulse responses can be retrieved 
from the SVAR model by tt BAu 
1 , and the variance-covariance matrix required for the 
estimation of forecast error variance decomposition can be calculated based on 
11   ABBAu  . To allow the for the identification of the matrix B, we further assume 
that the structural innovations t  are orthonormal, i.e., its covariance matrix is an identity 
matrix   IE tt  , and therefore,  
11   AAu          (16) 
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Due to the symmetry of the covariance matrix, the minimum number of restrictions for 
identification is 2)1(
2  KKK , where K is the dimension of the VAR system, and therefore 
we need to impose 22 restrictions in the SVAR for just-identification. In the specification of 
the matrix B in equation (10), there are 12 restrictions and hence, the matrix A requires 
another 10 restrictions for just-identification. The specification of the matrix A has 11 
restrictions, and therefore we have an over-identified SVAR with one degree of freedom. To 
estimate the parameters specified in the matrices A and B, one then can minimise the negative 
of the concentrated log-likelihood function, 
     ABBAtrTBTATKTBAL uc 1122
~
2
ln
2
ln
2
2ln
2
,ln       (17) 
where K is the dimension of the system, T is the sample size,  A  and B  are the 
determinants of the matrices, u
~
 is the sample estimate of the variance-covariance matrix for 
the reduced formed error process u , and  .tr  is the trace of the indicated matrix.  
3. Data and Preliminary Statistics  
For the analysis, we collect from the Datastream three data sets with daily frequency for the 
period from the 31st of December 2004 to the 31st of December 2014. The first data set 
comprises of the daily closing price index for 12 stock exchanges across the globe, including 
SSE Composite Index of China, TOPIX of Japan, KOSPI of Korea, TAIEX of Taiwan, 
HANG SENG Index of Hong Kong, STI of Singapore, ASX200 of Australia, MICEX Index 
of Russia, DAX30 of Germany, CAC40 of France, FTSE100 of the UK, and S&P500 of the 
USA. The daily stock market returns, iR , of each country are the logarithmic first difference 
of the stock price index multiplied by 100. The second data set are the foreign exchange 
indices of the Chinese currency with respect to country 2’s currency, where country 2 is one 
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of the 11 countries listed above.4 The depreciation rate of the Chinese currency with respect 
to country 2’s currency, fx , is calculated as the logarithmic first difference of the foreign 
exchange index multiplied by 100. The third data set are the short-term interest rates of each 
country, including the interbank overnight of China, the uncollateral overnight of Japan, the 
overnight call rate of Korea, the overnight repo rate of Taiwan, the overnight deposit of Hong 
Kong, the interbank call of Singapore, the overnight deposit of Australia, the overnight 
deposit of Russia, the overnight interbank of Germany, the Eu-Franc short-term deposit of the 
France, the LIBID/LIBOR overnight of the UK, and the overnight repo of the USA.5  The 
interest rate differential of China with respect to country 2 id  is calculated as the difference 
between the Chinese interest rate and country 2’s interest rate multiplied by 100.   
For the problem of non-synchronous trading hours, whereby the opening and closing hours 
with reference to the Greenwich Mean Time of various stock markets are different, we adopt 
a simple method similar to Cai et al. (2009) by lagging one day on the US and European data 
sets. With regard to the different sample observations in different countries due to each 
country’s specific holiday and institutional arrangements, we follow the existing literature, 
for example, Wang and Firth (2004) and Wang and Wang (2010), by excluding the dates 
when any one of the stock markets was closed.   
Because there have been several dramatic changes in the financial environment faced by 
international markets during the full period, we split the full sample into three sub-periods; 
namely, the pre-crisis period from the 31st of December 2004 to the 8th of August 2007, the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) period from the 9th of August 2007 to the 8th of May 2010, and 
                                                          
4 Due to the data availability, we apply the cross rate calculations to acquire the exchange rate of the Chinese 
currency with respect to the Russian, South Korean or Taiwanese currency, whereby the common currency for 
calculation is the US dollar.  
5 Most of the overnight rates are middle rates, except for Germany and China where the rates are offered 
rates.  
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the Eurozone Debt Crisis (EDC) period from the 9th of May 2010 to the 31st of December 
2014. The dates chosen for splitting the full sample are based on the information acquired 
from the Fulltime of the Financial Crisis released by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
The 9th of August 2007 was the key date that marked the beginning of the Global Financial 
Crisis when the banking system was seized by the information that the derivatives they held 
were actually worth a lot less than they previously imagined, and consequently the banks 
stopped doing business with each other. The 9th of May 2010 was the key date that marked 
the beginning of the Eurozone Debt Crisis when the global economy was threatened by the 
possible solvency of the governments in the Eurozone. With the division, the sample sizes for 
these three sub-periods are 495, 525, and 884 respectively.  
Table 1 reports the preliminary statistics of each period for the 12 sampled stock markets. 
The sample mean of the pre-crisis period for each of the stock markets is positive and 
relatively large, while the sample means of the two crises periods are generally smaller or 
even non-profitable. The standard deviation is generally highest in the GFC period and lowest 
in the pre-crisis period. Only Russia’s stock market has standard deviations higher than those 
of China’s stock market, and interestingly, the standard deviations of both markets in the pre-
crisis period are higher than those in the EDC period. The rest of the basic statistics also 
indicate that the impacts of both crises on the global stock markets are substantial, and the 
investment in China’s stock market is generally risker than in other stock markets.      
Table 2 reports the correlate of China’s stock market with the global financial markets. The 
upper of the table displays the correlation between China’s stock market and one of the other 
11 stock markets. Overall, the correlations of stock markets are highly significant, although in 
the pre-crisis period the correlations between China and the Western markets are not 
significant. The middle of the table displays the correlation between China’s stock market 
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and the relevant foreign exchange market. The correlation generally has become highly 
significant after the outburst of the global financial crisis. The interesting case is Hong Kong 
where none of the correlations in three periods is significant. The lower of the table displays 
the correlation between China’s stock market and the relevant interest rate differential in 
money markets. There is some evidence that China’s stock market has become more 
correlated to money markets after the global financial crisis.         
4. Empirical Evidence 
4.1 The world-factor model 
The estimation of the world-factor model in equation (1) is reported in Table 3. The non-
significance of   indicates that there is no expected excess return against the return of the 
US stock market for each of the stock markets.6 The significance and the magnitude of   
suggest that China’s stock market is less integrated to USA’s stock market, while the Japan’s 
and all the European stock markets are more integrated with the USA’s than those of other 
Asian stock markets. The magnitude of the loading of extra world-factor risk, i.e., y , 
suggests that the unique risk of Russia’s stock market is higher than that of China’s stock 
market.   
After acquiring the extra world-factor risk y  for each of the stock market from the residual 
series of the world-factor model, we proceed to estimate the VAR process in equation (15).    
4.2 SVAR estimates  
                                                          
6 The world-factor model is estimated with the full sample size. The basic assumption is that the 
interdependence between China and world’s financial markets is constant and therefore, any change of 
parameter estimates throughout three sub-periods in the subsequent estimation of matrix A should ascribe to 
the contagion phenomena of financial markets.    
  
17 
 
To choose the appropriate lag length p for the VAR process, we use the log-likelihood ratio 
test with the maximum leg length being 50, thereby roughly catching one season’s dynamic 
in the system. For the VAR process to satisfy the stability condition, we make sure that all of 
the characteristic roots lies within the unit circle. We also test the autocorrelation LM test for 
up to 50 lags, and make sure that the null of no serial correlation is adhered to.7    
As explained in the previous section, the matrix A in equation (9) is over-identified with one 
degree of freedom, and hence we can test the possibility that either 13  or  14  is non-zero. In 
other words, the over-identified SVAR system allows us to test whether China’s stock market 
is contemporarily affected by the relevant foreign exchange or money market. For testing the 
possibility, we apply the likelihood ratio test with its statistic, 
      ucRcLR BALBAL ,ln,ln2 11         (18) 
where  uc BAL ,ln  and   1,ln Rc BAL  are the concentrated log-likelihood functions for the just-
identified SVAR and the over-identified SVAR with one degree of freedom, with their 
estimates computed by the equation (17).  It can be shown that 1LR  has an asymptotic 
2 -
distribution with one degree of freedom, and its critical value of 5% significance level is 
roughly equal to 3.8415, i.e.,   8415.312 05.0  . We therefore reject the null of the restricted 
model and then proceed to estimate the unrestricted model if  1205.01 XLR  .  
For the stock markets in the European zone, because today’s price in China cannot possibly 
affect yesterday’s price in Europe, we impose the restriction 021  . As a result, we have a 
different A matrix for the European countries, that is,      
                                                          
7 The result is available upon request.  
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The matrix in equation (19) is obviously over-identified with 2 degrees of freedom. The 
specification therefore allows us to test the possibility that either 13  or  14  is non-zero or 
both of them are non-zero. We start the test by applying the following likelihood ratio test 
with its statistic, 
    122 ,ln,ln2 RcRcLR BALBAL          (20) 
where   2,ln Rc BAL  is the concentrated log-likelihood function for the over-identified SVAR 
with two degree of freedoms. The variable 2LR  has the 
2 -distribution with one degree of 
freedom, so we reject the null of two restrictions SVAR and then proceed to estimate the one 
restriction SVAR if  1205.02 XLR  . Following the same logic, we then compare the one 
restriction SVAR with the just-identified SVAR by applying equation (18). If the procedure 
further takes us to select the just-identified SVAR, then this would suggest that China’s stock 
market responds instantaneously to the changes of exchange rate and interest rate differential.    
Table 4 reports the parameter estimates of the matrix A in the pre-crisis period for each of the 
10 countries paired with China. The non-significance of 
12  for most of the estimations 
indicates that in general China’s stock market was not contemporarily affected by other stock 
markets in the pre-crisis period. The general non-significance of 
21  also suggests that 
China’s stock market did not contemporarily affect other stock markets. Nonetheless, the 
non-zero of 
13  and 14  as well as the high significance of 23  and 24  for several Asian 
countries suggest that the Asian stock markets were interdependent with each other through 
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their instantaneous connections in the foreign exchange and money markets. The loadings of 
idiosyncratic shocks   suggest that the investment in stock market is much riskier than the 
investments in foreign exchange and money markets. The result also suggests that China’s 
stock market has higher unique risk than other stock market does, except for Russia’s.           
Table 5 reports the parameter estimates of the matrix A in the GFC period.  The estimates of 
12  and 21  suggest that China’s stock market has become contemporarily affected by other 
stock markets, and in a lesser degree, China’s stock market also has had more significant 
influences on other Asian stock markets.  The non-zero of 13  and 14  as well as the high 
significance of 23  and 24  for the European countries suggest that both China’s and the 
European’s stock markets have become more sensitive to the risk in the relevant foreign 
exchange and money markets in the GFC period. In addition, the high significance of the 
estimates of 23  for the Asian countries suggests that the Asian stock markets in general 
were sensitive to the change of foreign exchange rates. The loadings of idiosyncratic shocks 
  obviously show that investments in any of the financial market, including the stock 
exchange, foreign exchange and money markets, have become much riskier in the GFC 
period. China’s stock market in this period again has a higher unique risk when compared to 
other stock markets, except for Russia’s.  
Table 6 reports the parameter estimates of the matrix A in the EDC period.  The estimate of 
12  suggests that China’s stock market has become even more sensitive to other Asian stock 
markets, while the role of the European stock markets on China’s is minor. However, China’s 
stock market is indirectly connected to the European stock markets through the contemporary 
connections of stock market with foreign exchange and money markets, as indicated by the 
relevance of 
13 , 14 , 23  and 24 .  The general significance of 23  again suggests that the 
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Asian stock markets were sensitive to the change of foreign exchange rates. The estimate of 
  suggests that the unique risk of stock markets as well as that of foreign exchange markets 
have become smaller, while the unique risk of money markets has become larger in the EDC 
period, when compared to GFC period.      
Altogether, the three tables suggest that after the GFC period China’s stock market generally 
has become more integrated with the Asian stock markets. In the pre-crisis period, only 
Korea’s stock market has bi-directional ‘return spillover’ effect with China’s, and only 
Australia’s stock market has uni-directional ‘return spillover’ effect to China’s. The 
interesting case is Hong Kong where none of the   parameters is significant, indicating the 
isolation between China’s and Hong’s stock markets in this period. Our result is consistent 
with that of Huyghebaert and Wang (2010) who find no evidence of stock market integration 
between China and other Asian markets after the Asian financial crisis.8 In the GFC period, 
however, the bi-directional ‘return spillover’ effect is found for the cases of Korea and 
Australia, while the uni-directional ‘return spillover’ effect is found from Japan’s and 
Singapore’s stock markets to China’s. In the EDC period, the bi-directional ‘return spillover’ 
effect is found to exist in three cases, namely Taiwan, Singapore and Australia, whereas the 
uni-directional ‘return spillover’ effect is found to spread from the stock markets of Japan, 
Korea and Hong Kong to China’s stock market. The three tables suggest that China’s stock 
market and the European stock markets have been generally non-sensitive to each other 
through time, but they also suggest that foreign exchange and money markets have been the 
important channels in transmitting risk between China’s and the European stock markets after 
the GFC period.  
4.3 Impulse response function  
                                                          
8 Their empirical evidence is for the study between 1st of July, 1992 and 30st of June, 2003. 
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As can be seen in the previous section, the unexpected part of the SVAR system, i.e., tB  in 
equation (13), will reach its impacts on the observed vector 
ty  via the instantaneous relation 
tt BAu   through the VAR system (14) to the regressand. The structure of the matrix A 
therefore can be thought of as the risk transmission channel through which the magnitude of 
idiosyncratic shocks tB  casts its immediate impacts on the current prices of financial 
markets, and then with the dynamics of the VAR system its subsequent impacts on the future 
prices of financial markets. The dynamic system of transmitting risk can be expressed more 
clearly if we rewrite the VAR system (15) into a Wold moving average representation, 
  2211 tttt uuuy        (21) 
where, 
 


s
j
jjss A
1
         (22) 
with   KI0  
Accordingly, the impulse response function that can be calculated based on the Wold MV 
decomposition for a stable VAR(p) process has the immediate impulse response equal to 
tt BAu 
1 . The product of matrices BA 1  therefore can be thought of as the measurement 
of whether each element of the idiosyncratic shocks 
t  has significant immediate impacts on 
the financial markets. In other words, the immediate impulse response functions allow us to 
differentiate the sources of risk to stock markets.       
Table 7 reports the immediate impulse response functions of China’s stock market to four 
idiosyncratic shocks, namely the shocks of China’s stock market, country 2’s stock market, 
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the relevant foreign exchange market and interest rate differential. Since 1  is the 
idiosyncratic shock of China’s stock market, it is not surprising that the parameter estimates 
of immediate impulse response of China’s stock market to its own shock, i.e., the numbers in 
the two columns beneath 1 , are all highly significant. The estimates of immediate impulse 
response of China’s stock market to country 2’s stock market shock, i.e., the numbers in the 
two columns beneath 2 , suggest that in general China’s stock market responded 
immediately to the Asian stock market shocks, especially in the two crises period. The 
estimates of immediate impulse response of China’s stock market to the European stock 
market shocks, however, are not significant except for Russia’s and UK’s in the GFC period. 
With respect to the foreign exchange shocks, the estimates of immediate impulse response of 
China’s stock market are generally significant, especially in the two crises periods. As for the 
money market, there is also some evidence that China’s stock market responded immediately 
to the shock of interest rate differential.           
Table 8 reports the immediate impulse response functions of global stock markets to the four 
idiosyncratic shocks in the three sub-periods. Since 2  is the idiosyncratic shock of country 
2’s stock market itself, it is not surprising that the parameter estimates of immediate impulse 
response of country 2’s stock market to its own shock, i.e., the numbers in the two columns 
beneath 2 , are all highly significant. The estimates of immediate impulse response of 
country 2’s stock market to China’s stock market shock, i.e., the numbers in the two columns 
beneath 1 , suggest that in general the Asian stock markets were not instantaneously 
responsive to China’s stock market shock, although Australia’s stock market was a special 
case that responded immediately to China’s in all three sub-periods. Notice that the estimates 
of immediate impulse response of the European stock markets to China’s stock market shock 
are zero. The reason is we impose in the matrix A in equation (19) the element 021   
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since there exists the problem of non-synchronous trading hours between China’s and the 
European stock markets. The estimates of immediate impulse response of the Asian stock 
markets to the foreign exchange shocks are overall highly significant, while the immediate 
impulse response of the European stock markets to the foreign exchange shocks is generally 
weak. Finally, although the immediate impulse response of stock markets to the money 
market shocks is not strong, the European stock markets seemingly are more responsive to 
the money market shocks than the foreign exchange shocks.    
Altogether, the two tables suggest that the volatility of financial assets provides an increasing 
important role in connecting China’s stock market with other Asian stock markets. Before the 
GFC period, there were two cases of bi-directional ‘volatility spillover’ effect with China, 
namely the stock markets of Korea and Australia. Since the GFC period, however, there has 
been more cases of bi-directional ‘volatility spillover’ effect with China, including Korea, 
Australia, and Singapore in the GFC period, and Australia, Singapore and Taiwan in the EDC 
period. While there was no uni-directional ‘volatility spillover’ effect from China’s stock 
market to others in any sub-period, there were some cases of uni-directional ‘volatility 
spillover’ effect from others to China’s stock market. These include the case of Japan in the 
GFC period, and the cases of Japan, Hong Kong, and Korea in the EDC period. There were 
also the uni-directional ‘volatility spillover effect’ from Russia and UK’s stock markets to 
China’s in the GFC period. The empirical evidence overall suggests that the linkage of 
China’s stock market with the Asian stock markets has become stronger through time, but the 
volatility spillover effect is not symmetrical; China’s stock market has become more 
influenced by the volatility of other stock markets, while its influence on others has not 
increased as equally.    
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As mentioned previously, the structure of the matrix A can be thought of as the risk 
transmission channel, and correspondingly the immediate impulse response functions can be 
used to identify the sources of risk to stock markets. From this perspective, Table 7 and Table 
8 together suggest that the most important source of risk to stock market is its own 
idiosyncratic shock. The results also suggest that the idiosyncratic shocks of the Asian stock 
markets are important sources of risk to China’s stock market. In contrary, the idiosyncratic 
shock of China’s stock market seems not to be as important as a source of risk to the Asian 
stock markets. Interestingly, the result also strongly suggests that the idiosyncratic shock of 
foreign exchange markets is a common source of risk to both China’s and the Asian stock 
markets. With regard to the European financial markets, there is no evidence that the 
idiosyncratic shock of the European stock markets is a source of risk to China’s stock market. 
There is some evidence, however, that the idiosyncratic shock of the relevant foreign 
exchange markets is a source of risk to China’s stock market. Finally, there is also some weak 
evidence that the idiosyncratic shock of the relevant money markets is a source of risk to the 
European stock markets.  
4.3 Forecast error variance decomposition 
After the identification of the sources of risk to stock markets, a complementary question one 
can ask is how relatively important each of these sources of risk is to the stock markets. To 
answer this question, we employ the forecast error variance decomposition since it separates 
the variation in an endogenous variable into the component shocks to the VAR system. In our 
study, we display the relative importance of each idiosyncratic shock to stock market for 
roughly up to one-month time, i.e., 20 periods, since the relative contribution of each 
idiosyncratic shock to stock market has become quite stable thereafter.  
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Table 9 displays the variance decomposition of China’s stock market in the pre-crisis period. 
As expected, the most important source of risk to China’s stock market is its own 
idiosyncratic shock, i.e., 1 . Moreover, by looking at the columns beneath 2 , the variance 
decomposition recognises that the idiosyncratic shocks of Australia’s, Korea’s and Japan’s 
stock markets are important sources of risk to China’s stock market, while the idiosyncratic 
shocks of the European stock markets and other Asian stock markets are much less important. 
Table 10 displays the variance decomposition of China’s stock market in the GFC period. 
The result suggests that the idiosyncratic shocks of Australia’s, Singapore’s, Korea’s and 
Hong Kong’s stock markets are important sources of risk to China’s stock market, apart from 
the own idiosyncratic shock of China’s stock market. Table 11 displays the variance 
decomposition of China’s stock market in the EDC period. The major sources of risk to 
China’s stock market are still its own idiosyncratic shock and the idiosyncratic shocks of 
Asian stock markets, except for that of Japan’s stock market.  
The three tables altogether suggest that China’s stock market has become more influenced by 
the idiosyncratic shocks of Asian stock markets through time. The inspection of individual 
country further suggests that the stock markets of Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan have 
become more important in contributing to the variation of China’s stock market through time, 
while the stock markets of Japan and Korea have become less important. Our result therefore 
is consistent to the results of Hatemi-J and Roca (2004) and Zhou, Zhang and Zhang (2012) 
that the Chinese cultural background provides a risk factor in China’s stock market. With 
regard to the European stock markets, the result suggests that the idiosyncratic shocks of the 
European stock markets generally play very minor roles in determining the variation of 
China’s stock market. The result is consistent with that of impulse response functions in 
Table 7. Furthermore, the results from the columns beneath fx  and id  in the three tables 
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suggest that the idiosyncratic shocks of foreign exchange and money markets, whether from 
Asia or from Eurpore, are not important sources of risk to China’s stock market. 
To investigate the influences of China’s stock market shock on the global stock markets, we 
now turn to Tables 12 to 14. Table 12 shows the variance decomposition of the global stock 
markets in the pre-crisis period. As expected, the most important source of risk to any 
country’s stock market is its own idiosyncratic shock, represented by 2 . The result also 
suggests that the idiosyncratic shock of China’s stock market is generally an important source 
of risk to other Asian stock markets, while it plays a very minor role in contributing to the 
variation of European stock markets. Table 13 shows the variance decomposition of the 
global stock markets in the GFC period. The own idiosyncratic shock is unsurprisingly the 
most important source of risk to a country’s stock market. The result also suggests that the 
idiosyncratic shock of China’s stock market is an important source of risk to Australia’s, 
Singapore’s and Hong Kong’s stock markets. Table 14 shows the variance decomposition of 
the global stock markets in the EDC period. The role of China’s stock market as the risk 
source to the Asian stock markets has generally diminished, although it is still important for 
Australia’s and Hong Kong’s stock markets. The three tables also suggest that China’s stock 
market is not an important source of risk to the European stock markets. Altogether we 
therefore find no empirical evidence that China’s stock market has become more influential 
to the global stock markets through time.  
Further inspection of the influence of China on other Asian countries suggests that China’s 
stock market is not an important risk source to Taiwan’s and Singapore’s stock markets, 
despite in the GFC period Singapore’s stock market showed vulnerability to the idiosyncratic 
shock of China’s. By contrast, Hong Kong’s stock market has been greatly influenced by the 
variation of China’s stock market throughout the samples. Combined with the results in 
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Tables 9 to 11, our study suggests that there are different degrees of integration with the 
Chinese culture cluster. Interestingly, Australia’s stock market also shows high integration 
with China’s stock market, which may be due to China being the largest trade partner of 
Australia. Finally, the role of China’s stock market in determining the variation of Japan’s 
and Korea’s stock markets is diminishing. The overall results from Table 9 to 14 therefore 
suggest that only Australia’s and Hong Kong’s stock markets show evidence of integration 
with China’s stock market.     
In particular, the results from the columns beneath 
fx  in Tables 12 to 14 suggest that most of 
the Asian stock markets are greatly influenced by the idiosyncratic shocks of foreign 
exchange markets, except for Hong Kong. The reason for the minor influence of China-Hong 
Kong exchange rate on Hong Kong’s stock market might be because China and Hong Kong 
both heavily peg their currencies to the U.S. dollar. Further inspection suggests that the 
idiosyncratic shock of foreign exchange market in some cases is even more important than 
the shock of China’s stock market. For example, Taiwan’s stock market has been more 
influenced by the shock of China-Taiwan exchange rate than by the shock of China’s stock 
market throughout the sample, and Japan’s and Korea’s stock markets are also more 
vulnerable to the shocks in currency markets than the shock of China’s stock market in both 
crises period. By contrast, for the European stock markets the risk emanating from currency 
market is much less important; only Russia’s stock market in the GFC period is critically 
influenced by the shock of the relevant foreign exchange market. In addition, despite the 
impulse response function suggests that some European stock markets, for example, 
Germany, France and the U.K. in the GFC period, and Russia in the EDC period, are 
sensitive to idiosyncratic shocks in money markets, the variance decomposition suggests that 
the money markets are not important sources of risk.   
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In essence, the result of forecast error variance decomposition suggests that the degree of 
China’s stock market being influenced by Asian stock markets is greater than the degree of 
influence it has on the Asian stock markets. It also suggests that the foreign exchange and 
money markets are not risk sources to China’s stock market, while the foreign exchange 
markets are the important sources of risk to other Asian stock markets. In addition, the result 
suggests that the European stock markets are quiet disconnected from China’s stock market 
even in the crisis period. Although there is some evidence from the impulse response 
functions that foreign exchange and money markets are the sources of risk to the China’s and 
European’s stock markets in crises period, the magnitudes of these risks arrived in the stock 
markets are actually minor. In short, the result of variance decomposition not only is 
consistent with that of the impulse response functions, but it also provides some further 
evidence for inspecting the extent to which the idiosyncratic shock of financial markets 
transmits to each other.    
5. Conclusion  
Finding out the causality of a national equity market with international financial markets is an 
empirical question of great importance to both policy makers and investors. With the 
increasing liberalisation of China’s capital markets, many researchers have devoted to the 
study of the ‘spillover’ effect between China’s stock market and international stock markets. 
In this paper, we specified a structural form that determines the instantaneous relationship 
among equity, currency and money markets, which was then analysed by a SVAR model. In 
other words, we used the SVAR model to test the ‘return spillover’ as well as ‘volatility 
spillover’ effects between stock markets, with the preview that currency and money markets 
may function as the linkages between stock markets.         
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The empirical evidence from the test of ‘return spillover’ suggested that China’s stock market 
has become more integrated with the Asian stock markets since the global financial crisis. 
The evidence also showed that there was no contemporary ‘return spillover’ effect between 
China’s and the European stock markets, although the currency and money markets may have 
functioned as the linkages between them since the global financial crisis. The empirical 
evidence from the test of ‘volatlity spillover’ also indicated that the integration of China’s 
stock market with the Asian stock markets has become stronger, with further suggestion that 
the effect is not symmetrical; China’s stock market has become more influenced by the 
volatility of the Asian stock markets through time, but China’s influence on Asia has not 
increased as equally. In addition, the volatility of China’s stock market is generally unrelated 
to the volatility of the European stock markets, although in the global financial crisis there 
was the uni-directional ‘volatility spillover’ from Russia and UK to China. 
Furthermore, the SVAR model allowed us to identify the idiosyncratic shocks specified in the 
structural form system. With this perspective, the immediate impulse response functions can 
be viewed as a test on the statistical significance of the risk sources of financial markets and 
the forecast error variance decompositions can be viewed as an examination on the relative 
importance of the risk sources, while the structural relationship among financial markets can 
be thought of as the risk transmission channel. The most important risk source of China’s 
stock market, as suggested by the immediate impulse response functions, is the own 
idiosyncratic shock, followed by the shocks in the Asian stock markets. By contrast, the 
idiosyncratic shock of China’s stock market is not an important source of risk to both the 
Asian and European stock markets. Interestingly, the impulse response functions also 
suggested that currency markets were a common source of risk to both China’s and the Asian 
stock markets. The forecast error variance decompositions further suggested that China’s 
stock market has become more influenced by the stock markets with the Chinese culture 
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background, including Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. However, in these three Chinese 
culture markets, only Hong Kong showed bi-directional integration with China. The other 
stock market in Asia that showed bi-directional integration with China is Australia’s. 
Interestingly, in spite of being insensitive to China’s stock market, Japan’s, Korea’s and 
Taiwan’s stock markets displayed sensitivity to the shocks in the relevant currency markets. 
Economically, this may result from the heavy peg of China’s currency to the US currency, 
and hence the ostensibly high sensitivity of these three stock markets to the shocks of 
currency markets is actually a response to the volatility of the US currency.  
In summary, we found that the within-asset behaviour of equity unsurprisingly provides the 
strongest international transmission of financial shocks, but it is not cross-regional between 
China and the European zone, once the common world factor of the US stock market has 
been taken into account. We also found that the international cross-assets behaviour between 
equity and currency is significant within Asia, and it is also cross-regional between China and 
the European zone in the global financial crisis. Finally, we also found some evidence that 
the cross-assets behaviour between equity and money is cross-regional in the global finical 
crises, although in general it has very minor role in the determination of the variation of 
equity asset.      
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Table 1. The preliminary statistics for the sampled stock markets 
Pre is pre-crisis period, GFC is the global financial crisis period, and EDC is the Eurozone debt crisis period.  
Std.Dev is the standard deviation. 
 
  Period Mean Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
CHN Pre 0.1340 1.7050 7.8904 -9.2561 -0.7136 7.4149 443.1306 
 
GFC -0.1327 2.2588 8.8874 -8.0436 -0.0816 4.1650 30.2728 
 
EDC -0.0186 1.1976 4.2336 -5.5826 -0.3076 5.3157 211.4654 
JPN Pre 0.0474 1.0084 3.5403 -3.6444 -0.3420 4.3816 48.9166 
 
GFC -0.0663 2.0064 12.8647 -10.0071 0.0099 8.3664 629.9691 
 
EDC 0.0194 1.2803 6.4275 -9.9519 -0.8314 9.8984 1854.6710 
KOR Pre 0.1162 1.1124 3.4489 -4.1766 -0.5315 4.0920 47.8004 
 
GFC -0.0570 1.9580 11.2844 -11.1720 -0.6600 9.3559 921.7980 
 
EDC 0.0310 1.0768 4.9000 -6.4202 -0.2873 6.9028 573.2122 
TWN Pre 0.0547 0.9890 2.9030 -4.3504 -0.8803 6.3498 294.7734 
 
GFC -0.0094 1.7138 6.5246 -5.9333 -0.1575 4.3853 44.1487 
 
EDC 0.0321 0.9779 4.4594 -5.7422 -0.3694 6.0161 355.1738 
HKG Pre 0.0954 0.9265 2.8292 -4.0792 -0.5561 4.8068 92.6578 
 
GFC -0.0564 2.2886 12.0580 -8.6647 0.1342 5.5753 146.6565 
 
EDC -0.0033 1.1260 5.4778 -5.3917 -0.2075 5.1101 170.3421 
SGP Pre 0.0782 0.9117 3.5139 -3.7373 -0.7047 5.7174 192.8756 
 
GFC -0.0694 1.7442 7.5305 -8.6960 -0.1730 5.9159 188.6062 
 
EDC 0.0203 0.7957 3.2896 -3.7693 -0.4563 5.4148 245.4586 
AUS Pre 0.0763 0.7895 2.0691 -3.3597 -0.4895 4.1171 45.4126 
 
GFC -0.0507 1.5499 5.6282 -6.8976 -0.0925 4.4712 48.0984 
 
EDC 0.0177 0.9396 3.5767 -4.0832 -0.2095 4.1979 59.3159 
RUS Pre 0.1553 2.0108 10.1454 -10.1439 -0.6986 7.3920 437.2252 
 
GFC -0.0025 3.3981 25.2261 -19.1777 0.5830 13.9648 2659.7080 
 
EDC -0.0047 1.4162 5.5070 -11.4189 -0.8240 8.9939 1423.3190 
DEU Pre 0.0708 0.9330 2.6051 -3.4633 -0.3383 3.6569 18.3035 
 
GFC 0.0210 1.9066 10.7975 -7.0828 0.6075 8.9940 818.2100 
 
EDC 0.0271 1.2677 5.1566 -5.9947 -0.2428 4.9929 154.9723 
FRA Pre 0.0500 0.8700 2.4225 -3.2272 -0.3422 3.8764 25.4510 
 
GFC 0.0084 1.9647 10.5946 -7.0633 0.5845 7.8139 536.8150 
 
EDC -0.0053 1.3274 5.5785 -5.6346 -0.2661 4.9883 156.0453 
GBR Pre 0.0381 0.7416 2.6045 -3.1975 -0.4094 5.0205 97.8354 
 
GFC 0.0190 1.8050 9.3843 -7.4291 0.4147 7.2507 410.2899 
 
EDC 0.0079 0.9725 3.9430 -4.5936 -0.2492 4.7203 118.1569 
USA Pre 0.0552 0.6874 2.3864 -2.6946 -0.2174 4.2684 37.0065 
 
GFC -0.0141 1.9562 10.9572 -9.4695 0.0514 8.9133 765.1409 
  EDC 0.0553 0.9832 4.6317 -4.9002 -0.2127 6.6633 500.9634 
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Table 2. The correlate of China’s stock market with the global financial markets 
ρ(R1,R2) JPN KOR TWN HKG SGP AUS RUS DEU FRA GBR USA 
Pre 0.1538*** 0.1911*** 0.1572*** 0.2692*** 0.1967*** 0.1519*** 0.0392 0.0429 0.0412 0.0464 0.0525 
 
(3.4532) (4.3185) (3.5303) (6.2011) (4.4507) (3.4091) (0.8696) (0.9518) (0.9138) (1.0292) (1.1664) 
GFC 0.2926*** 0.3352*** 0.3199*** 0.4931*** 0.3331*** 0.3014*** 0.1562*** 0.1403*** 0.1557*** 0.1861*** 0.1988*** 
 
(6.9973) (8.1365) (7.7212) (12.9607) (8.0802) (7.2280) (3.6164) (3.2409) (3.6038) (4.3294) (4.6405) 
EDC 0.2494*** 0.3664*** 0.3699*** 0.5548*** 0.3640*** 0.3852*** 0.1135*** 0.1656*** 0.1582*** 0.1610*** 0.2121*** 
 
(7.6485) (11.6952) (11.8086) (19.8037) (11.6051) (12.3982) (3.3922) (4.9871) (4.7589) (4.8461) (6.4460) 
            ρ(R1,fx) JPN KOR TWN HKG SGP AUS RUS DEU FRA GBR USA 
Pre -0.0364 0.1048*** 0.0128 -0.0587 0.0129 0.0485 -0.0162 0.0240 0.0240 0.0190 -0.0445 
 
(-0.8079) (2.3378) (0.2828) (-1.3050) (0.2851) (1.0769) (-0.3597) (0.5326) (0.5326) (0.4225) (-0.9889) 
GFC -0.0337 0.2509*** 0.1613*** -0.0247 0.1518*** 0.1622*** 0.1899*** 0.1263*** 0.1263*** 0.1135*** -0.0365 
 
(-0.7705) (5.9267) (3.73801) (-0.5642) (3.5127) (3.7600) (4.4228) (2.9119) (2.91191) (2.6134) (-0.8347) 
EDC -0.0849*** 0.2992*** 0.2417*** -0.0426 0.2451*** 0.3024*** 0.1013*** 0.1739*** 0.1739*** 0.1166*** -0.1101*** 
 
(-2.5318) (9.3121) (7.3981) (-1.2671) (7.5081) (9.4210) (3.0231) (5.2453) (5.2453) (3.4879) (-3.2893) 
            ρ(R1,id) JPN KOR TWN HKG SGP AUS RUS DEU FRA GBR USA 
Pre 0.0731 -0.0123 0.0673 -0.0222 0.0060 0.0151 -0.0207 -0.0355 -0.0398 0.0419 -0.0432 
 
(1.6267) (-0.2735) (1.4953) (-0.4931) (0.1326) (0.3360) (-0.4597) (-0.7883) (-0.8838) (0.9291) (-0.9585) 
GFC -0.1210*** 0.0617 -0.0469 -0.0770 -0.1249*** 0.07908 -0.0803 0.0538 0.0577 0.0743 -0.0271 
 
(-2.7868) (1.4143) (-1.0739) (-1.7651) (-2.8785) (1.8142) (-1.8414) (1.2314) (1.3212) (1.7035) (-0.6196) 
EDC -0.0613*** -0.0317 -0.0603 -0.0615 -0.0607 -0.0314 -0.0813*** -0.0429 -0.0443 -0.0596 -0.0621 
  (-1.8226) (-0.9430) (-1.7941) (-1.8314) (-1.8053) (-0.9344) (-2.4237) (-1.2745) (-1.3159) (-1.7732) (-1.8482) 
**significance at the 5 percent level. ***significance at the 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses.  
 ρ(R1,R2) is the correlation coefficient between China’s and the indicated country’s stock markets. ρ(R1,fx) is the correlation coefficient between China’s stock market and the foreign 
exchange market of China with respect to the indicated country. ρ(R1,id) is the correlation coefficient between China’s stock market and the interest rate differential of China with 
respect to the indicated country.     
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Table 3. The world-factor model with the S&P 500 being proxy for the world-factor 
  CHN JPN KOR TWN HKG SGP AUS RUS DEU FRA GBR 
α -0.0188 -0.018774 0.0128 0.0118 -0.0008 -0.0020 -0.0044 0.0147 0.0111 -0.012494 -0.0019 
 
(0.0380) (0.0285) (0.0290) (0.0255) (0.0299) (0.0246) (0.0207) (0.0488) (0.0246) (0.0259) (0.0223) 
β 0.2314*** 0.6032*** 0.4427*** 0.4078*** 0.5317*** 0.3473*** 0.5102*** 0.6273*** 0.7106*** 0.7010*** 0.5718*** 
 
(0.0298) (0.0223) (0.0228) (0.0200) (0.0232) (0.0193) (0.0162) (0.0383) (0.0193) (0.0203) (0.0175) 
σy 1.6576 1.2423 1.2651 1.1121 1.4273 1.0744 0.9012 2.1272 1.0734 1.1309 0.9734 
                        
**significance at the 5 percent level. ***significance at the 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses.  
α is the expected excess return of the indicatd stock market above the return of the US stock market.  β is the loadings of common world factor on the indicated stock market.  σy is the 
magnitude of the loading of extra world-factor risk.  
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Table 4. Parameter estimates of Matrix A that measures the return spillover between China and the indicated country in the pre-crisis period 
  JPN KOR TWN HKG SGP AUS RUS DEU FRA GBR 
ϒ12 0.8733 1.2360*** -0.1648  -0.3551 0.0184 2.1920** -0.0212 0.0088 0.0303 0.0491 
 
(0.5903) (0.3730) (0.2900) (1.0178) (1.0283) (0.9665) (0.0387) (0.0923) (0.0977) (0.1234) 
ϒ13 
   
-1.4794 
      
    
(0.7677) 
      ϒ14 3.6134** 
 
5.7192*** 
       
 
(1.5709) 
 
(1.3761) 
       ϒ21 -0.2117 -0.3770** 0.114178 0.1712 0.08954 -0.3140 
    
 
(0.2219) (0.1769) (0.0818) (0.1895) (0.2326) (0.1867) 
    ϒ23 -0.3241*** 0.7119*** 1.1193*** 
 
0.3002** 0.03379 0.2468 0.0124 -0.0034 -0.0968 
 
(0.1118) (0.1934) (0.1658) 
 
(0.1475) (0.0717) (0.4197) (0.0777) (0.0733) (0.0597) 
ϒ24 1.7021 4.1609*** -1.0141 -0.3871 0.1098 2.6537*** 0.0062 -0.5707 -0.5526 0.1827 
 
(1.3198) (1.2744) (0.8555) (0.2960) (0.5054) (0.9307) (0.2470) (0.6930) (0.6684) (0.4549) 
ϒ34 -0.1020 0.0874 0.1724 0.0030 -0.0088 0.5974 -0.0211 0.0274 0.0686 0.3246 
 
(0.4394) (0.3267) (0.2041) (0.0401) (0.1581) (0.4466) (0.0272) (0.4235) (0.4328) (0.3540) 
δ1 1.7895*** 1.8924*** 1.7140*** 1.8147*** 1.6739*** 2.0048*** 1.6710*** 1.6118*** 1.6363*** 1.7015*** 
 
(0.1980) (0.1923) (0.0799) (0.3030) (0.1637) (0.3666) (0.0546) (0.0541) (0.0549) (0.0559) 
δ2 1.0905*** 1.2794*** 0.8881*** 0.7838*** 0.7943*** 0.8732*** 1.9959*** 0.8285*** 0.7943*** 0.6391*** 
 
(0.1821) (0.1956) (0.0319) (0.0550) (0.0261) (0.2136) (0.0652) (0.0278) (0.0267) (0.0210) 
δ3 0.5260*** 0.3755*** 0.2544*** 0.1064*** 0.2484*** 0.5808*** 0.2198*** 0.5063*** 0.5144*** 0.4978*** 
 
(0.0177) (0.0126) (0.0085) (0.0032) (0.0081) (0.0195) (0.0072) (0.0170) (0.0173) (0.0164) 
δ4 0.0568*** 0.05455*** 0.0589*** 0.1134*** 0.0725*** 0.0616*** 0.3738*** 0.0567*** 0.0564*** 0.0653*** 
 
(0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0034) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0122) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0021) 
ln Lc(A,B)R2             -2050.356# -1072.220# -1064.704# -1080.655# 
ln Lc(A,B)R1 -1184.912 -1016.528# -847.3352 -851.963# -914.1897# -1060.169# -2050.340 -1072.030 -1064.282 -1080.368 
ln Lc(A,B)U -1182.996# -1015.701 -839.2107# -851.962 -913.6987 -1060.167 -2049.894 -1069.079 -1062.119 -1076.491 
**significance at the 5 percent level. ***significance at the 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 ln Lc(A,B)R2, ln Lc(A,B)R1, and ln Lc(A,B)u are the concentrated log-likelihood estimates for the over-identified SVAR with 2 degree of freedoms, the over-identified SVAR with 1 
degree of freedom, and the just-identified SVAR respectively. # is the parameterisation of Matrix A selected by using likelihood ratio test.  
For the case of Hong Kong, we re-parameterise the first and second rows because the original parameterisation does not hold up.    
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Table 5. Parameter estimates of Matrix A that measures the return spillover between China and the indicated country in the GFC period 
  JPN KOR TWN HKG SGP AUS RUS DEU FRA GBR 
ϒ12 0.5069** 0.5998*** 0.3986 0.0924 1.2267*** 1.7051*** 0.0874** 0.0493 0.0224 0.1439 
 
(0.2430) (0.1401) (0.2250) (0.2825) (0.3588) (0.4047) (0.0368) (0.0753) (0.0724) (0.0769) 
ϒ13 
      
0.4585*** 0.4048*** 0.4783*** 0.4372*** 
       
(0.1665) (0.1442) (0.1458) (0.1249) 
ϒ14 
     
-2.9524 1.0353*** 
  
4.9467** 
      
(1.6365) (0.3438) 
  
(2.0137) 
ϒ21 -0.133470  -0.1394**  -0.0153 0.4365  -0.4929  -0.4270*** 
    
 
(0.1277) (0.0693) (0.0963) (0.2472) (0.2526) (0.1519) 
    ϒ23 -0.5142*** 0.6695*** 1.4958***  -3.6814*** 1.2977*** 0.4450*** -0.4956** 0.0306 -0.0294 0.040010 
 
(0.0918) (0.0627) (0.2213) (1.0128) (0.3469) (0.0912) (0.2053) (0.0869) (0.0918) (0.0738) 
ϒ24 -1.8811 0.6127 -0.0048 0.1110 -0.7395 2.6085*** 0.8450** 4.1803*** 3.3877** 3.6949*** 
 
(1.3523) (1.2157) (1.0234) (0.8775) (1.6542) (0.8221) (0.4246) (1.2498) (1.4232) (1.1788) 
ϒ34 0.6040 -0.6685 0.1572 -0.0120 0.4549 0.0591 0.1448 0.3914 -0.4632 0.4625 
 
(0.7055) (0.9557) (0.2152) (0.0360) (0.3112) (0.5951) (0.0942) (0.6593) (0.7103) (0.7257) 
δ1 2.1466*** 2.2262*** 2.1841*** 2.0336*** 2.3728*** 2.6142*** 2.2151*** 2.2066*** 2.2411*** 2.1877*** 
 
(0.0947) (0.0815) (0.0699) (0.2680) (0.2724) (0.2747) (0.0715) (0.0716) (0.0726) (0.0703) 
δ2 1.5269*** 1.4729*** 1.3955*** 1.8915*** 1.9619*** 1.5614*** 2.7472*** 1.3298*** 1.4106*** 1.2935*** 
 
(0.1046) (0.0734) (0.0693) (0.0714) (0.3840) (0.2394) (0.0887) (0.0431) (0.0457) (0.0416) 
δ3 0.8000*** 1.1587*** 0.2936*** 0.0776*** 0.3713*** 1.1449*** 0.6108*** 0.7018*** 0.7043*** 0.7966*** 
 
(0.0256) (0.0369) (0.0093) (0.0023) (0.0119) (0.0370) (0.0197) (0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0256) 
δ4 0.05128*** 0.0546*** 0.0614*** 0.0893*** 0.0542*** 0.0878*** 0.2960*** 0.0488*** 0.0454*** 0.0499*** 
 
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0017) (0.0028) (0.0096) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0016) 
ln Lc(A,B)R2             -2779.149 -1608.948 -1616.598  -1698.785 
ln Lc(A,B)R1 -1762.317# -1983.110# -1367.380# -1219.862# -1374.698# -2036.253 -2774.768 -1605.043# -1611.277# -1650.590 
ln Lc(A,B)U -1762.269 -1982.158 -1366.476 -1219.225 -1373.459 -2034.331# -2770.276# -1604.058 -1611.268 -1689.592# 
**significance at the 5 percent level. ***significance at the 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 ln Lc(A,B)R2, ln Lc(A,B)R1, and ln Lc(A,B)u are the concentrated log-likelihood estimates for the over-identified SVAR with 2 degree of freedoms, the over-identified SVAR with 1 
degree of freedom, and the just-identified SVAR respectively. # is the parameterisation of Matrix A selected by using likelihood ratio test.  
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Table 6. Parameter estimates of Matrix A that measures the return spillover between China and the indicated country in the EDC period 
  JPN KOR TWN HKG SGP AUS RUS DEU FRA GBR 
ϒ12 0.2136** 0.4669*** 0.7082*** 0.9831*** 0.8887*** 0.9639*** 0.0319 0.0475 0.0340  -0.0059 
 
(0.0903) (0.0899) (0.1328) (0.3158) (0.1701) (0.1694) (0.0323) (0.0427) (0.0418) (0.0578) 
ϒ13 
       
0.2199*** 0.2263*** 0.2604*** 
        
(0.0670) (0.0670) (0.0915) 
ϒ14 -0.5263** 
         
 
(0.2640) 
         ϒ21  -0.0370 -0.0834  -0.1986**  -0.4550  -0.1546**  -0.2362*** 
    
 
(0.0785) (0.0569) (0.0856) (0.5132) (0.0724) (0.0842) 
    ϒ23  -0.7278*** 0.9263*** 1.5637***  -0.6605 0.7730*** 0.4494*** -0.0040 0.06222 0.0931 -0.1476*** 
 
(0.0595) (0.0646) (0.1652) (0.4229) (0.0866) (0.0521) (0.0422) (0.0537) (0.0548) (0.0547) 
ϒ24 -0.1912 -0.2815 -0.2056 -0.9627** -0.1606 -0.0861 0.5279** 0.2102 0.2861 0.1395 
 
(0.2394) (0.1877) (0.1989) (0.4614) (0.1642) (0.1656) (0.2066) (0.2054) (0.2075) (0.1574) 
ϒ34 0.0406 -0.0071 -0.0590 0.0227 -0.2602*** -0.3345** 0.2506 -0.2538 -0.2183  -0.2249** 
 
(0.1393) (0.1079) (0.0471) (0.0278) (0.0750) (0.1336) (0.1674) (0.1306) (0.1293) (0.0993) 
δ1 1.1241*** 1.0972*** 1.1309*** 1.0072*** 1.1129*** 1.1421*** 1.1425*** 1.1206*** 1.1194*** 1.1328*** 
 
(0.0277) (0.0280) (0.0377) (0.1024) (0.0374) (0.0466) (0.0276) (0.0271) (0.0271) (0.0277) 
δ2 1.0041*** 0.8195*** 0.8784*** 1.2800*** 0.7037*** 0.7802*** 1.2062*** 0.8970*** 0.9152*** 0.6776*** 
 
(0.0296) (0.0290) (0.0512) (0.4471) (0.0433) (0.0550) (0.0292) (0.0217) (0.0221) (0.0166) 
δ3 0.5946*** 0.4716*** 0.2086*** 0.1125*** 0.3242*** 0.6320*** 0.9785*** 0.5714*** 0.5714*** 0.4286*** 
 
(0.0145) (0.0115) (0.0050) (0.0025) (0.0079) (0.0155) (0.0237) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0105) 
δ4 0.1473*** 0.1512*** 0.1500*** 0.1261*** 0.1489*** 0.1638*** 0.2001*** 0.1497*** 0.1511*** 0.1492*** 
 
(0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0028) (0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0048) (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0036) 
ln Lc(A,B)R2             -3728.377# -2760.069 -2784.863 -2231.881 
ln Lc(A,B)R1 -2818.824 -2413.639# -1803.936# -1341.952# -1914.835# -2574.965# -3727.020 -2754.709# -2779.195# -2227.850# 
ln Lc(A,B)U -2816.844# -2413.475 -1803.405 -1341.887 -1914.683 -2574.934 -3726.092 -2754.279 -2778.575 -2226.865 
**significance at the 5 percent level. ***significance at the 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 ln Lc(A,B)R2, ln Lc(A,B)R1, and ln Lc(A,B)u are the concentrated log-likelihood estimates for the over-identified SVAR with 2 degree of freedoms, the over-identified SVAR with 1 
degree of freedom, and the just-identified SVAR respectively. # is the parameterisation of Matrix A selected by using likelihood ratio test.  
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Table 7. Parameter estimates of Matrix A-1B that measures the volatility spillover from the indicated country to China’s stock market 
**significance at the 5 percent level. ***significance at the 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
  Unique Shocks ε1 ε2 εfx εid   Unique Shocks ε1 ε2 εfx εid 
JPN Pre 1.5103*** 0.8038 -0.1256 0.2459*** AUS Pre 1.1875*** 1.1338*** 0.0255 0.2140*** 
  
(0.2521) (0.4593) (0.0813) (0.0818) 
  
(0.2905) (0.2986) (0.0542) (0.0779) 
 
GFC 2.0106*** 0.7249** -0.1953** -0.0534 
 
GFC 1.5127*** 1.5406*** 0.5027*** 0.0783 
  
(0.1378) (0.3264) (0.0938) (0.0416) 
  
(0.2319) (0.2174) (0.0999) (0.1012) 
 
EDC 1.1153*** 0.2128*** -0.0917*** -0.0837** 
 
EDC 0.9303*** 0.6126*** 0.2230*** -0.0304 
  
(0.0329) (0.0894) (0.0392) (0.0394) 
  
(0.0656) (0.0890) (0.0387) (0.0230) 
KOR Pre 1.2909*** 1.0787*** 0.2254*** 0.1942*** RUS Pre 1.6710*** -0.0423 -0.0012 0.0000 
  
(0.1973) (0.2250) (0.0695) (0.0662) 
  
(0.0546) (0.0772) (0.0029) (0.0020) 
 
GFC 2.0544*** 0.8151*** 0.4293*** 0.0050 
 
GFC 2.2151*** 0.2402*** 0.2536*** 0.3462*** 
  
(0.1024) (0.1776) (0.1005) (0.0415) 
  
(0.0715) (0.1014) (0.1020) (0.1030) 
 
EDC 1.0561*** 0.3683*** 0.1963*** -0.0196 
 
EDC 1.1425*** 0.0385 -0.0001 0.0034 
  
(0.0374) (0.0688) (0.0388) (0.0149) 
  
(0.0276) (0.0390) (0.0013) (0.0037) 
TWN Pre 1.6823*** -0.1437 -0.0461 0.3387*** DEU Pre 1.6118*** 0.0073 0.0001 -0.0003 
  
(0.0605) (0.2482) (0.0799) (0.0807) 
  
(0.0541) (0.0764) (0.0007) (0.0030) 
 
GFC 2.1708*** 0.5529 0.1740 0.0056 
 
GFC 2.2066*** 0.0656 0.2851 0.0178 
  
(0.1078) (0.3107) (0.1009) (0.0263) 
  
(0.0716) (0.1001) (0.1017) (0.0206) 
 
EDC 0.9915*** 0.5453*** 0.2025*** -0.0277 
 
EDC 1.1206*** 0.0426 0.1274*** -0.0070 
  
(0.0578) (0.0906) (0.0384) (0.0203) 
  
(0.0271) (0.0383) (0.0384) (0.0054) 
HKG Pre 1.7108*** -0.2623 -0.1484** 0.0142 FRA Pre 1.6363*** 0.0241 -0.0001 -0.0009 
  
(0.1202) (0.7091) (0.0737) (0.0417) 
  
(0.0549) (0.0776) (0.0012) (0.0033) 
 
GFC 2.1190*** 0.1821 -0.0275*** 0.0013 
 
GFC 2.2411*** 0.0316 0.3364*** -0.0066 
  
(0.0181) (0.1428) (0.0011) (0.1952) 
  
(0.0726) (0.1021) (0.1033) (0.0193) 
 
EDC 0.6959*** 0.8695*** -0.0505 -0.0837*** 
 
EDC 1.1194*** 0.0366 0.1314*** -0.0059 
  
-(0.2431) -(0.1939) -(0.0294) -(0.0330) 
  
(0.0271) (0.0383) (0.0384) (0.0055) 
SGP Pre 1.6766*** 0.0146 0.0014 0.0001 GBR Pre 1.7015*** 0.0314 -0.0024 0.0005 
  
(0.0552) (0.8195) (0.0769) (0.0081) 
  
(0.0559) (0.0789) (0.0061) (0.0019) 
 
GFC 1.4787*** 1.4998*** 0.3683*** -0.0062 
 
GFC 2.1877*** 0.1861** 0.3529*** 0.2836*** 
  
(0.2894) (0.2776) (0.0964) (0.0701) 
  
(0.0703) (0.0996) (0.1004) (0.1015) 
 
EDC 0.9784*** 0.5498*** 0.1958*** -0.0421** 
 
EDC 1.1328*** -0.0040 0.1120*** -0.0089 
   (0.0602) (0.0935) (0.0383) (0.0213)    (0.0277) (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0051) 
  
43 
 
Table 8. Parameter estimates of Matrix A-1B that measures the volatility spillover from China to the indicated country’s stock market 
  Unique Shocks ε1 ε2 εfx εid   Unique Shocks ε1 ε2 εfx εid 
JPN Pre -0.3197 0.9204*** -0.1439*** 0.0465 AUS Pre -0.3729*** 0.5172*** 0.0116 0.0976*** 
  
(0.2830) (0.1019) (0.0465) (0.0468) 
  
(0.1319) (0.0946) (0.0246) (0.0303) 
 
GFC -0.2683 1.4302*** -0.3853*** -0.1053 
 
GFC -0.6460*** 0.9036*** 0.2948*** 0.1980*** 
  
(0.2406) (0.0631) (0.0669) (0.0671) 
  
(0.1346) (0.0950) (0.0516) (0.0528) 
 
EDC -0.0412 0.9962*** -0.4294*** -0.029412 
 
EDC -0.2197*** 0.6355*** 0.2313*** -0.0316 
  
(0.0869) (0.0245) (0.0360) (0.0375) 
  
(0.0640) (0.0259) (0.0239) (0.0235) 
KOR Pre -0.4866*** 0.8728*** 0.1824*** 0.1572*** RUS Pre 0.0000  1.9959*** 0.0543 0.0004 
  
(0.1566) (0.0887) (0.0454) (0.0452) 
  
(0.0000) (0.0652) (0.0923) (0.0923) 
 
GFC -0.2865** 1.3592*** 0.7159*** 0.0083 
 
GFC 0.0000 2.7472*** -0.3027*** 0.2289 
  
(0.1317) (0.0497) (0.0666) (0.0692) 
  
(0.0000) (0.0887) (0.1258) (0.1264) 
 
EDC -0.0881 0.7888*** 0.4205*** -0.0419 
 
EDC 0.0000  1.2062*** -0.0039 0.1054*** 
  
(0.0578) (0.0201) (0.0293) (0.0310) 
  
(0.0000) (0.0292) (0.0413) (0.0414) 
TWN Pre 0.1921 0.8717*** 0.2795*** -0.0097 DEU Pre 0.0000  0.8285*** 0.0063 -0.0324 
  
(0.1352) (0.0407) (0.0432) (0.0442) 
  
(0.0000) (0.0278) (0.0393) (0.0393) 
 
GFC -0.0333 1.3870*** 0.4365*** 0.0141 
 
GFC 0.0000  1.3298*** 0.0215 0.2048*** 
  
(0.2078) (0.0444) (0.0640) (0.0654) 
  
(0.0000) (0.0432) (0.0610) (0.0614) 
 
EDC -0.1969*** 0.7701*** 0.2860*** -0.0392 
 
EDC 0.0000  0.8970*** 0.0356 0.0291 
  
(0.0745) (0.0257) (0.0278) (0.0279) 
  
(0.0000) (0.0217) (0.0307) (0.0307) 
HKG Pre 0.2928 0.7390*** -0.0254 -0.0415 FRA Pre 0.0000  0.7943*** -0.0017 -0.0312 
  
(0.3057) (0.1234) (0.0293) (0.0323) 
  
(0.0000) (0.0267) (0.0377) (0.0377) 
 
GFC 0.9251 1.9710*** -0.2978*** 0.0144 
 
GFC 0.0000  1.4106*** -0.0207 0.1546*** 
  
(0.5464) (0.2597) (0.0906) (0.0826) 
  
(0.0000) (0.0457) (0.0647) (0.0649) 
 
EDC -0.3166 0.8844*** -0.0513** -0.0852*** 
 
EDC 0.0000  0.9152*** 0.05321 0.0402 
  
(0.2469) (0.0899) (0.0281) (0.0289) 
  
(0.0000) (0.0221) (0.0313) (0.0314) 
SGP Pre 0.1501 0.7956*** 0.0747** 0.0078 GBR Pre 0.0000  0.6391*** -0.0482 0.0099 
  
(0.3906) (0.0778) (0.0374) (0.0369) 
  
(0.0000) (0.0210) (0.0297) (0.0298) 
 
GFC -0.7289*** 1.2226*** 0.3003*** -0.0050 
 
GFC 0.0000  1.2935*** 0.0319 0.1853*** 
  
(0.2339) (0.1404) (0.0654) (0.0572) 
  
(0.0000) (0.0416) (0.0588) (0.0591) 
 
EDC 0.1513*** 0.6187*** 0.2203*** 0.0474** 
 
EDC 0.0000  0.6776*** -0.0633***  0.025777 
   (0.0624) (0.0208) (0.0226) (0.0227)    (0.0000) (0.0166) (0.0235) (0.0235) 
**significance at the 5 percent level. ***significance at the 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 9. Variance decomposition of China’s stock market in the pre-crisis period 
  Sources of shocks   Sources of shocks 
Effect from Period ε1 ε2 εfx εid Effect from Period ε1 ε2 εfx εid 
JPN 1 75.9497 21.5107 0.5256 2.0140 AUS 1 51.4267 46.8792 0.0237 1.6705 
 
2 74.8593 21.6493 1.2190 2.2723 
 
2 51.0001 45.8641 0.0609 3.0749 
 
3 74.5418 21.6504 1.2181 2.5897 
 
3 51.3072 45.5210 0.0695 3.1024 
 
10 71.5815 21.1204 3.0748 4.2232 
 
10 50.4438 42.4594 1.8410 5.2558 
 
20 68.3369 20.6563 4.4426 6.5642 
 
20 46.8075 41.3826 5.9916 5.8183 
KOR 1 57.0981 39.8682 1.7410 1.2927 RUS 1 99.9359 0.0640 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2 56.6706 40.0426 1.7629 1.5239 
 
2 99.5544 0.3482 0.0502 0.0472 
 
3 55.7906 39.3527 3.2303 1.6264 
 
3 99.0094 0.6553 0.2565 0.0788 
 
10 52.5122 36.4312 6.5248 4.5318 
 
10 93.4300 2.4106 3.0005 1.1589 
 
20 50.8008 35.5874 7.4677 6.1441 
 
20 87.0509 4.7628 5.7260 2.4604 
TWN 1 95.3666 0.6954 0.0715 3.8666 DEU 1 99.9980 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2 94.6880 0.6901 0.2397 4.3821 
 
2 96.4363 0.0104 2.1845 1.3687 
 
3 93.8618 0.9049 0.8495 4.3838 
 
3 95.6689 0.7182 2.2070 1.4059 
 
10 87.0991 3.1701 2.1308 7.5999 
 
10 90.5917 2.4795 4.2077 2.7212 
 
20 80.5413 6.0293 3.8471 9.5823 
 
20 81.0338 4.8657 8.1411 5.9593 
HKG 1 96.9832 2.2803 0.7298 0.0067 FRA 1 99.9784 0.0216 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2 96.4458 2.4643 0.7544 0.3355 
 
2 96.2854 0.0208 2.8073 0.8864 
 
3 96.2996 2.5067 0.7820 0.4117 
 
3 94.3489 1.9484 2.7585 0.9442 
 
10 90.4169 4.3873 3.8829 1.3129 
 
10 89.4524 3.5648 4.5576 2.4252 
 
20 85.4555 5.4964 5.9985 3.0496 
 
20 81.9710 4.9495 8.6066 4.4729 
SGP 1 99.9923 0.0076 0.0001 0.0000 GBR 1 99.9658 0.0340 0.0002 0.0000 
 
2 98.3120 0.2452 1.3067 0.1361 
 
2 99.4287 0.1499 0.3873 0.0342 
 
3 96.7609 1.6322 1.4429 0.1640 
 
3 98.7810 0.4458 0.6291 0.1440 
 
10 92.8767 3.9841 1.9266 1.2126 
 
10 94.7173 2.1442 1.6364 1.5021 
 
20 84.5638 6.5511 5.8111 3.0740 
 
20 85.9769 2.9176 6.6791 4.4264 
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Table 10. Variance decomposition of China’s stock market in the GFC period  
  Sources of shocks   Sources of shocks 
Effect from Period ε1 ε2 εfx εid Effect from Period ε1 ε2 εfx εid 
JPN 1 87.7083 11.4023 0.8276 0.0618 AUS 1 46.5047 48.2351 5.1358 0.1245 
 
2 87.1023 11.3632 1.4647 0.0697 
 
2 44.9773 48.8720 5.9655 0.1852 
 
3 86.4186 11.3703 2.0797 0.1314 
 
3 44.8931 48.8253 6.0847 0.1969 
 
10 82.6011 12.7301 3.6468 1.0221 
 
10 43.0869 46.7238 8.7467 1.4426 
 
20 78.0087 12.3579 5.7443 3.8892 
 
20 42.6597 45.0735 9.9255 2.3413 
KOR 1 83.2578 13.1061 3.6356 0.0005 RUS 1 95.3026 1.1206 1.2491 2.3277 
 
2 82.6797 13.4687 3.8467 0.0050 
 
2 94.6824 1.3055 1.7008 2.3113 
 
3 82.4180 13.5901 3.9590 0.0329 
 
3 91.7512 1.3565 2.1241 4.7683 
 
10 78.1094 13.8900 6.4941 1.5065 
 
10 88.9991 2.9090 2.7909 5.3010 
 
20 75.3429 14.6120 7.7710 2.2742 
 
20 85.1249 4.2089 4.8698 5.7963 
TWN 1 93.3444 6.0552 0.5997 0.0006 DEU 1 98.2659 0.0869 1.6408 0.0064 
 
2 93.1930 6.2030 0.6021 0.0019 
 
2 96.5188 0.5068 2.3143 0.6601 
 
3 92.9801 6.1973 0.7922 0.0304 
 
3 95.8971 0.5127 2.5250 1.0653 
 
10 89.0738 8.9093 1.3079 0.7090 
 
10 90.8339 4.0296 2.8118 2.3247 
 
20 84.5724 9.6937 3.1740 2.5600 
 
20 84.9841 7.4085 4.5562 3.0512 
HKG 1 99.2505 0.7328 0.0167 0.0000 FRA 1 97.7763 0.0195 2.2034 0.0008 
 
2 97.9840 1.1684 0.0165 0.8311 
 
2 96.9066 0.0213 3.0637 0.0083 
 
3 97.0296 1.2337 0.8194 0.9173 
 
3 96.6176 0.1803 3.0571 0.1450 
 
10 90.2132 3.4623 2.7057 3.6188 
 
10 92.1959 2.5825 3.2878 1.9338 
 
20 81.9907 6.3439 5.6595 6.0059 
 
20 86.4935 6.1941 4.2592 3.0531 
SGP 1 47.8288 49.2030 2.9674 0.0008 GBR 1 95.2329 0.6889 2.4779 1.6003 
 
2 45.9412 47.7176 5.6564 0.6849 
 
2 95.0278 0.6823 2.4660 1.8239 
 
3 45.3670 47.9171 5.5775 1.1384 
 
3 93.8751 0.9060 2.9805 2.2384 
 
10 44.1263 45.6822 7.8381 2.3535 
 
10 88.8756 3.7159 4.2849 3.1237 
 
20 43.5615 41.9939 10.6898 3.7548 
 
20 84.5158 5.5369 5.9566 3.9906 
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Table 11. Variance decomposition of China’s stock market in the EDC period 
  Sources of shocks   Sources of shocks 
Effect from Period ε1 ε2 εfx εid Effect from Period ε1 ε2 εfx εid 
JPN 1 95.3466 3.4706 0.6447 0.5381 AUS 1 67.0170 29.0610 3.8504 0.0716 
 
2 94.7306 3.9518 0.7605 0.5571 
 
2 66.3692 29.6143 3.9365 0.0800 
 
3 94.6000 3.9140 0.7853 0.7006 
 
3 65.9088 29.2814 4.3550 0.4549 
 
10 91.3051 4.5495 2.7976 1.3478 
 
10 64.0232 28.8327 5.5360 1.6082 
 
20 87.9429 6.2010 3.3668 2.4894 
 
20 61.4820 28.7377 7.2361 2.5442 
KOR 1 86.4686 10.5139 2.9878 0.0297 RUS 1 99.8857 0.1135 0.0000 0.0009 
 
2 86.1979 10.7797 2.9745 0.0479 
 
2 99.6600 0.1455 0.1586 0.0359 
 
3 85.6727 10.7381 3.2722 0.3170 
 
3 98.8934 0.2588 0.6105 0.2373 
 
10 83.1420 12.8084 3.4390 0.6105 
 
10 95.0445 1.2970 2.8663 0.7922 
 
20 78.9618 13.4906 5.8529 1.6947 
 
20 89.7028 1.9837 6.6427 1.6707 
TWN 1 74.3460 22.4931 3.1027 0.0582 DEU 1 98.5803 0.1424 1.2735 0.0038 
 
2 74.2627 22.5461 3.1331 0.0582 
 
2 98.1168 0.5028 1.3741 0.0063 
 
3 73.8950 22.3667 3.3637 0.3747 
 
3 97.0600 0.6800 1.6289 0.6310 
 
10 71.6820 23.1982 4.4313 0.6884 
 
10 95.2885 1.9318 2.0091 0.7705 
 
20 70.6563 22.7054 4.7362 1.9021 
 
20 90.8266 2.5095 4.6566 2.0073 
HKG 1 38.7496 60.4859 0.2038 0.5608 FRA 1 98.5338 0.1052 1.3583 0.0027 
 
2 38.9008 60.3063 0.2020 0.5909 
 
2 97.9534 0.5727 1.4583 0.0156 
 
3 38.8893 59.9209 0.4741 0.7158 
 
3 96.9291 0.6450 1.6752 0.7507 
 
10 38.4312 58.4781 1.9358 1.1550 
 
10 95.0106 1.9957 2.0669 0.9268 
 
20 36.7301 56.2301 3.6277 3.4122 
 
20 90.4492 2.9339 4.6242 1.9927 
SGP 1 73.6571 23.2568 2.9500 0.1362 GBR 1 99.0248 0.0012 0.9679 0.0061 
 
2 73.3538 23.4619 3.0191 0.1652 
 
2 97.8472 0.7685 1.2036 0.1807 
 
3 72.6518 23.1071 3.5025 0.7385 
 
3 96.2745 1.5314 1.5370 0.6571 
 
10 71.5709 23.2992 4.1260 1.0039 
 
10 93.0510 3.3764 2.6398 0.9328 
 
20 68.7648 23.1914 5.6165 2.4273 
 
20 89.7455 4.1572 3.7574 2.3399 
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Table 12. Variance decomposition of the indicated country’s stock market in the pre-crisis period 
  Sources of shocks   Sources of shocks 
Effect on Period ε1 ε2 εfx εid Effect on Period ε1 ε2 εfx εid 
JPN 1 10.5141 87.1341 2.1292 0.2227 AUS 1 33.4012 64.2760 0.0325 2.2904 
 
2 10.8581 86.3321 2.1092 0.7006 
 
2 31.2880 65.1421 0.6272 2.9426 
 
3 11.2656 85.3253 2.1383 1.2709 
 
3 30.3105 63.4646 3.2654 2.9595 
 
10 11.6266 79.6392 3.9516 4.7826 
 
10 28.9131 60.5506 5.5261 5.0101 
 
20 11.1058 75.7380 7.9166 5.2396 
 
20 27.6089 56.8589 8.5309 7.0014 
KOR 1 22.4134 72.1003 3.1485 2.3379 RUS 1 0.0000 99.9262 0.0738 0.0000 
 
2 23.1159 71.3556 3.2164 2.3121 
 
2 0.2924 99.5098 0.1833 0.0145 
 
3 23.4452 70.8906 3.3677 2.2965 
 
3 0.4697 97.8688 1.4495 0.2121 
 
10 24.5059 67.0124 3.7094 4.7724 
 
10 4.2084 89.9325 2.3473 3.5118 
 
20 23.5476 63.3525 7.7446 5.3553 
 
20 5.5639 85.8864 4.7601 3.7897 
TWN 1 4.2168 86.8434 8.9291 0.0108 DEU 1 0.0000 99.8420 0.0058 0.1523 
 
2 4.4976 85.5768 9.8249 0.1007 
 
2 0.0553 98.1520 0.6662 1.1265 
 
3 4.4866 85.2365 9.9251 0.3518 
 
3 0.0867 96.9157 1.0812 1.9164 
 
10 6.0993 78.3536 11.1907 4.3564 
 
10 1.7451 92.8437 2.2715 3.1397 
 
20 8.3508 73.0212 12.4590 6.1691 
 
20 3.6624 84.7328 6.3431 5.2618 
HKG 1 13.5153 86.1119 0.1017 0.2711 FRA 1 0.0000 99.8457 0.0005 0.1539 
 
2 15.5608 83.2054 0.1330 1.1009 
 
2 0.0027 99.2082 0.3767 0.4124 
 
3 15.7964 82.5173 0.1784 1.5080 
 
3 0.0035 99.2032 0.3772 0.4160 
 
10 21.4007 74.7566 1.6393 2.2035 
 
10 2.9882 92.8359 0.9202 3.2557 
 
20 20.9292 72.2668 3.1437 3.6602 
 
20 4.5320 84.6293 4.6963 6.1424 
SGP 1 3.4091 95.7382 0.8435 0.0092 GBR 1 0.0000 99.4106 0.5656 0.0238 
 
2 5.1068 93.0195 1.5318 0.3419 
 
2 0.1502 98.9043 0.7382 0.2073 
 
3 5.1475 91.3408 3.1703 0.3414 
 
3 0.1692 98.1875 1.4298 0.2135 
 
10 7.6284 84.4607 5.2147 2.6961 
 
10 2.8156 94.0351 2.2449 0.9044 
 
20 9.6169 79.6527 7.7292 3.0013 
 
20 5.2445 86.4559 4.6926 3.6070 
  
  
48 
 
Table 13. Variance decomposition of the indicated country’s stock market in the GFC period 
  Sources of shocks   Sources of shocks 
Effect on Period ε1 ε2 εfx εid Effect on Period ε1 ε2 εfx εid 
JPN 1 3.1627 89.8307 6.5199 0.4867 AUS 1 30.6865 60.0389 6.3926 2.8821 
 
2 3.0420 89.7341 6.6941 0.5298 
 
2 29.1947 61.1687 6.1064 3.5302 
 
3 3.1247 89.5298 6.7795 0.5660 
 
3 29.3007 60.4236 6.1701 4.1057 
 
10 5.2222 84.2244 7.5874 2.9660 
 
10 28.6930 58.2461 8.4542 4.6067 
 
20 8.0369 77.8651 9.0743 5.0237 
 
20 28.4221 54.6943 10.8992 5.9844 
KOR 1 3.3609 75.6510 20.9852 0.0028 RUS 1 0.0000 98.1274 1.1913 0.6813 
 
2 3.6428 74.8482 20.9923 0.5168 
 
2 0.0062 88.9699 9.4528 1.5712 
 
3 4.2172 73.9923 20.8092 0.9813 
 
3 0.0204 88.2373 9.9919 1.7504 
 
10 4.7606 65.6350 28.0750 1.5294 
 
10 1.3701 82.3316 9.3250 6.9734 
 
20 7.3705 56.6648 32.1643 3.8004 
 
20 8.1293 71.3652 13.5144 6.9911 
TWN 1 0.0523 90.9322 9.0062 0.0093 DEU 1 0.0000 97.6593 0.0255 2.3153 
 
2 0.1014 90.6421 9.0319 0.2247 
 
2 0.0085 97.4856 0.3476 2.1583 
 
3 0.1671 89.4786 8.7697 1.5846 
 
3 0.4460 96.6137 0.7549 2.1854 
 
10 0.5363 86.0154 10.4246 3.0237 
 
10 0.8517 90.5355 2.2122 6.4006 
 
20 3.2543 78.6575 12.4277 5.6605 
 
20 4.0995 85.1971 3.3743 7.3291 
HKG 1 17.7191 80.4400 1.8366 0.0043 FRA 1 0.0000 98.7921 0.0213 1.1865 
 
2 18.2591 79.7137 1.8192 0.2080 
 
2 0.0438 98.5663 0.0828 1.3071 
 
3 18.5526 78.7234 2.0320 0.6921 
 
3 0.1921 98.4188 0.0827 1.3064 
 
10 18.4538 74.9543 3.6297 2.9622 
 
10 1.2959 90.6434 2.5603 5.5004 
 
20 17.2887 71.0860 6.8437 4.7816 
 
20 7.5886 80.5266 3.1466 8.7382 
SGP 1 25.1039 70.6349 4.2600 0.0012 GBR 1 0.0000 97.9309 0.0595 2.0097 
 
2 24.8238 70.4098 4.5132 0.2532 
 
2 0.2000 97.0695 0.6960 2.0345 
 
3 24.8120 69.4262 4.6047 1.1570 
 
3 0.2719 96.1463 0.7456 2.8362 
 
10 25.8368 63.6247 6.5799 3.9586 
 
10 0.7923 94.0296 1.2917 3.8864 
 
20 24.4966 59.0592 10.2451 6.1991 
 
20 6.8388 83.9194 1.4941 7.7477 
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Table 14. Variance decomposition of the indicated country’s stock market in the EDC period 
  Sources of shocks   Sources of shocks 
Effect on Period ε1 ε2 εfx εid Effect on Period ε1 ε2 εfx εid 
JPN 1 0.1440 84.1514 15.6312 0.0734 AUS 1 9.5271 79.7146 10.5618 0.1965 
 
2 0.1392 82.4217 17.3673 0.0718 
 
2 9.3879 79.2943 10.6964 0.6214 
 
3 0.1452 82.2258 17.4533 0.1757 
 
3 9.3900 79.2918 10.6961 0.6221 
 
10 0.8361 79.2436 18.6221 1.2982 
 
10 10.1061 76.8324 10.9763 2.0853 
 
20 1.4755 76.6933 19.4117 2.4196 
 
20 12.4354 72.0171 12.7771 2.7704 
KOR 1 0.9602 76.9541 21.8682 0.2175 RUS 1 0.0000 99.2409 0.0010 0.7581 
 
2 1.0165 77.1601 21.5908 0.2326 
 
2 1.9824 96.3749 0.9062 0.7366 
 
3 1.2635 76.5022 21.8995 0.3347 
 
3 2.0046 95.9666 1.3004 0.7284 
 
10 2.1405 74.6967 21.6140 1.5487 
 
10 1.9926 91.6954 4.7056 1.6063 
 
20 3.0436 71.2705 22.8433 2.8426 
 
20 2.9781 87.3604 7.0950 2.5665 
TWN 1 5.4223 82.9244 11.4386 0.2147 DEU 1 0.0000 99.7384 0.1567 0.1050 
 
2 5.6509 82.6743 11.4598 0.2150 
 
2 0.4928 98.1116 1.2793 0.1162 
 
3 5.7024 82.6297 11.4242 0.2437 
 
3 0.5602 97.9487 1.3044 0.1867 
 
10 6.3248 81.3440 11.5759 0.7553 
 
10 1.1220 94.7572 2.5679 1.5529 
 
20 6.9356 78.4822 12.6561 1.9261 
 
20 1.9261 92.3195 2.8589 2.8954 
HKG 1 11.2364 87.6556 0.2953 0.8126 FRA 1 0.0000 99.4722 0.3362 0.1915 
 
2 10.9939 87.8821 0.2882 0.8358 
 
2 0.4893 97.0085 2.2505 0.2517 
 
3 11.0759 87.5810 0.4990 0.8441 
 
3 0.5294 96.8138 2.2562 0.4006 
 
10 11.1174 86.0398 1.5139 1.3289 
 
10 1.6752 92.9747 3.6845 1.6657 
 
20 11.3279 82.4483 3.5906 2.6332 
 
20 2.7680 90.4742 4.0257 2.7321 
SGP 1 5.0150 83.8573 10.6367 0.4910 GBR 1 0.0000 98.9941 0.8626 0.1433 
 
2 4.9754 83.4543 11.0216 0.5488 
 
2 2.1400 96.5935 0.8977 0.3688 
 
3 5.0103 83.1396 10.9842 0.8659 
 
3 2.1385 96.5622 0.9252 0.3741 
 
10 5.7826 79.5481 13.2615 1.4078 
 
10 2.2285 93.9023 1.9881 1.8810 
 
20 7.3223 76.5228 14.2705 1.8844 
 
20 4.4690 90.0438 2.7486 2.7385 
 
